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from employment of the opposite sex" 71
 and thereby permit him to pay a
justifiably lower wage to his female employees. Because an employer who
utilizes female labor incurs this additional cost, coupled with his inability
to set-off this expense by paying these employees lower wages, will result in
many employers being financially prohibited from hiring, or continuing to
employ women workers. Thus, there looms the distinct possibility that this
well-meaning piece of social legislation, while providing the majority of work-
ing women with long awaited economic equality, will have the ironic effect
of eliminating from the labor market many members of the fair sex.
THOMAS P. KENNEDY
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
California recently enacted two amendments to its Retail Installment
Sales Act' (the Unruh Act) redefining the rights and obligations of a de-
faulting conditional buyer. The amendments concern such buyer's liability
for the expenses of retaking and storage when the seller has repossessed the
goods prior to a resale and the buyer's subsequent liability for any deficiency
remaining on the contract after the resale. These amendments differ
markedly from the common law, the pre-amendment California Retail In-
stallment Sales Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The amendments are part of a growing field of legislation designed to
protect the buyer under an unwise installment or conditional sales contract. 2
As a result of the increased popularity of this type of financing arrangement,
the law in this area is undergoing a period of legislative expansions Under-
lying these developments is the basic policy conflict between the desire to
protect the buyer-consumer to equalize his bargaining position with that of
the seller-lender and the reluctance to stifle business through over-regulation
of conditional sales financing' This note will trace briefly the development
71 109 Cong. Rec. 8705 (daily ed. May 23, 1963).
1 Cal. Civil Code § 1812.2 — 1812.5 (Supp. 1962), as amended by Cal. Laws 1963,
ch. 1952.
2 It is helpful to outline the nature of the conditional sale as a security device
regulating the rights of the parties to the agreement. The conditional buyer buys under a
deferred payment arrangement. If the buyer defaults, the seller has the power to realize
on his security interest in the buyer's obligation to pay. Ownership, title, and the
attendant risks as to the goods are divided between the parties. The chattel mortgage,
on the other hand, is not limited to the sale of goods, but covers any situation in which
money is lent against tangible security. It is essentially a conveyance from a debtor
to his creditor of a security interest in the property subject to the mortgage, which
binds the debtor until he has fully paid his debt. The chattel mortgagee, unlike the
conditional seller, must record to protect his security interest.
3 Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 Corn. L.Q.
38 (1958).
4 These conflicting policy considerations have been discussed by many of the
commentators. See Hogan, supra note 3; Project: Legislative Regulation of Retail
Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 623 (1960); Project: California Chattel
Security and Article 9 of the UCC, 8 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 813 (1961).
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of these policy considerations under the common law and under the various
statutes mentioned above.
At common law, the locus of the title was the key factor in determining
the legal rights of the parties. When the buyer promised to pay, in ex-
change for the goods, the seller retained legal title to the goods until that
promise was fulfilled. If the buyer defaulted, the seller's remedy was governed
by the title under the so-called "election of remedies" doctrine. In other
words, since repossession of the security by the seller operated to vest title
in the seller, he was precluded from bringing a subsequent action for the
price .° On the other hand, in suing for the price, the seller was held to have
treated the transaction as an absolute sale, thus waiving his right to retake
the goods. The retaking was considered a disaffirmation or rescission of the
contract.° This doctrine protected the buyer by insuring him against a
double recovery by the seller.
Let us now assume that the seller had exercised his option to repossess
and resell the goods, but that after the resale, there was a deficiency still
outstanding. Since the election of remedies doctrine provided that such
actions rescinded the contract, it would seem that a further suit on the now
non-existent contract for the deficiency would be barred. Although there is
some contra authority,'' the common law conditional seller was usually
allowed to sue for the deficiency, 8
 thus avoiding the election doctrine.° The
rationale for permitting such a suit was the policy of protecting the seller
by allowing him to get the full benefit of his bargain 10
To avoid the unsettled common law rules on the seller's right to a
deficiency, there developed the practice of writing the rights of the parties
upon default by the buyer into the contract." Since the seller always in-
sisted on a provision insuring his right to recover a deficiency, and since the
courts were reluctant to interfere with such private agreements," this pro-
cedure abrogated the election of remedies doctrine and the protection it
5
 Since the legislation in question is a California statute, California case law will be
cited whenever applicable. See, therefore, Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal. 353, 42 Pac.
435 (1895); James v. Allen, 23 Cal. App. 2d 205, 72 P.2d 570 (1937); Smith v. Miller,
5 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 P.2d 347 (1935) ; Martin Music Co. v. Robb, 115 Cal. App. 414,
1 P.2d 1000 (1931). •
6 See cases cited in note 5 supra.
7
 See James v. Allen, supra note 5, holding that the seller could not recover a
deficiency on these facts unless given this right by statute or by provision of the contract.
7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 623, supra note 4, at 711.
It has been said that the cases on the rights and liabilities of the parties once the
conditional buyer has defaulted are in "hopeless confusion." 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 623,
supra note 4. See 2A Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, Uniform Laws, Ann.,
166 (1924).
a A possible rationale for allowing a deficiency suit without abrogating the election
doctrine is the theory adopted by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act—namely, that
repossession by the seller is not a rescission of the contract, but merely a realization by
him on his reserved security interest. See infra note 25.
10
 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 623, supra note 4, at 712.
11
 Ravizza v. Budd & Quinn, Inc., 19 Cal. 2d 289, 120 P.2d 865 (1942) ; James
v. Allen, supra note 5. Sec Warren, Statutory Damages and the Conditional Sale, 20
Ohio L.J. 289 (1959).
12 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 623, supra note 4, at 714.
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afforded the buyer. Legislative intervention seemed necessary to protect the
buyer whose weaker bargaining position led him to accept such inequitable
contract provisions.
Many states attempted to solve this problem by enacting legislation of
the type generally known as retail installment sales acts. Under the California
enactment, the Unruh Act, 13 the secured party (the seller) is still required
to elect either suing for the price or repossessing the goods and proceeding
with a resale." The defaulting buyer is liable for the resale expenses if he
has received the proper notice and if he has paid less than eighty per cent
of the purchase price at the time of his default. The buyer is further pro-
tected by the requirement that the expenses be "reasonably incurred" by the
seller in "good faith in repairing [and] reconditioning the goods or pre-
paring them for sale.""
The Unruh Act allowed the seller to recover a deficiency if the buyer
had not paid more than eighty per cent of the purchase price (if he had, the
resale vests title in the seller)." The buyer is protected by the provision that
if the resale is not made within a reasonable time, the seller is deemed to
have waived his deficiency claim. Thus, the Unruh Act follows the election
of remedies doctrine in every case except where a deficiency has resulted.
Although the Unruh Act was designed to protect the consumer, 1 T the
amount of protection is dubious because the question of the scope of the
Act has not yet been resolved. There is a dearth of case law on this issue,
and the commentators are divided on whether the Act is limited to the con-
ditional sale or whether it encompasses similar devices such as chattel
mortgages taken in connection with a retail installment sale."
The recent amendments to the California Retail Installment Sales Act"
seem to absolve the buyer from liability for the resale expenses and deny to
the seller the right to recover a deficiency. The policy of protecting the
buyer has thus received its most extreme legislative treatment to date. Al-
though no litigation has yet arisen under the amendments, a literal reading
of the provisions reveals no limitation balancing the interest of the seller. 2°
Unlike the Unruh Act, the scope of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
is clear. Its provisions regulate conditional sales and chattel mortgages.
While the seller must still choose between the two inconsistent remedies,
repossession is no longer considered a rescission, but a realization on the
seller's reserved security interest?" The buyer is liable for the expenses
is The discussion of state retail installment sales acts will be generally confined
to the California statute, the Unruh Act.
14 Cal. Civil Code § 1812.2 (Supp. 1962).
12 Ibid.
le Cal. Civil Code § 1812.5 (Supp. 1962).
17 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 813, supra note 4, at 966. Compare Sher, The Unruh Act
and Chattel Mortgages—a Case of Legislative Oversight, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 282 (1961).
18 See generally Sher, supra note 17 and 7 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 623, supra note 4,
at 631.
19 Supra note 1.
29 Perhaps the only limitation is the limited coverage of the Unruh Act in the
broad field of secured transactions.
21 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 16.
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incurred during such retaking and resale22 on the theory that his original
liability on the contract continues after his default.23
The seller may also recover a deficiency from the buyer. 24 Since re-
possession is not a rescission but a foreclosure of the security interest on the
still executory contract, the seller's suit for a deficiency does not technically
violate the election of remedies doctrine, 25 although it does afford less pro-
tection to the buyer. The deficiency suit is allowed on the theory that the
seller has a right to the buyer's full performance of the contract—i.e., pay-
ment of the entire contract price. 2°
Although the buyer is somewhat protected by the requirement that the
resale be within a certain time, the underlying policy of the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act, as explained by one commentator, 27 is that the buyer,
having had the use of the goods, should compensate the seller for this
benefit. Since this theory ignores the buyer's payment, at least in part, for
such usage, the Act seems more favorable to the seller.
The Uniform Commercial Code differs from the cases and statutes dis-
cussed above in three main ways. First, the Code abolishes the distinction
between types of personal property security interests based on form and
creates a unitary concept, the security interest." Second, the rights and
obligations of the parties are not dependent upon the location of the title. 2°
Last, the remedies of the seller upon default are cumulative," so that a suit
for the price will not cause the seller to lose his security interest. 31
But the Code generally follows the previous legislation concerning the
rights of the parties on default. Unless otherwise agreed, the secured party
may retake32 and resell the goods.a 3 The buyer is liable for the expenses of
the repossession and resale process if they meet the standard of "commercial
reasonableness."34 And, unless otherwise agreed, the buyer is liable for any
deficiency."
Thus, while the declared purpose of the Unruh Act is to protect the
buyer, the Code emphasizes maximum realization on collateral to facilitate
the procurement of credit."
Legislative intervention to compensate for the weaker bargaining
22 Uniform Conditional Sales Act §§ 17-18.
23 Berlin Machine Works, Inc. v. Dehlbohm Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 566, 186 Pac. 513
(1919).
24 Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 22.
25 See supra note 9.
26
	 id6 IBbogert, supra note 8, at 164-65.2
28 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-102(a).
25 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-202.
ao Uniform Commercial Code § 9-501(1).
31 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 813, supra note 4, at 898-976; Uniform Commercial Code
§ 9-501(1).
32 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503.
33 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-504(1).
34 Ibid. Read in connection with § 9-503 changing the resale provisions to protect
the buyer when the collateral is heavy equipment.
35 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-504(2).
36 g U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 813, supra note 4, at 966.
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position of the buyer has led to various results, according to the language
and policy of the particular statute. The protection afforded the buyer under
the amended Unruh Act is clearly the most extensive. In determining
whether protection to such a degree is desirable, one must keep in mind the
limited coverage of the Act. 37 Although it is impossible to say with certainty,
it seems likely that the effect of the amendments will be to encourage sellers
to do one of two things, both of which would "cure" abuses in the present
modus operandi of installment financing. First, if the seller chooses to re-
possess and resell the goods, he will make every effort to secure a fair price
at the resale, since he can no longer look to the buyer for any deficiency.
While the seller may have to bear the hardship of a noticeable depreciation
in value, he will no longer resell at a ridiculously low price, leaving the
buyer, whose original default was probably due to his inability to pay, liable
for a huge deficiency. Second, the seller, probably unwilling to risk a resale
under these conditions, will be left the remedy of suing for the price, and
will thus be more cautious in selecting those persons to whom he will extend
credit. By discouraging resales, the amendments force the seller to rely on
the buyer's continued ability to pay; and this reliance will indirectly save,
as it were, the buyer from his own indiscretions.
Thus, while at first reading the amendments may seem overly favorable
to the buyer, they are really designed to rid consumer credit financing of
two of its most persistent villains—the unscrupulous seller and the "dead-
beat" buyer.
Another interesting development in the law of secured transactions
concerns the constitutional validity of the regulatory method in a recently
enacted Idaho statute. The statute outlaws the conditional sale of dairy
products equipment and further provides that all such existing arrange-
ments shall become automatically terminated 180 days after the effective
date of the act." The only ameliorating provision in this measure is that any
wholesaler, distributor, or processor may sell such equipment within the
above 180 day period if such contract shall be completed within 30 months.
The legislation, however, mentions nothing about the rights and obligations
of the parties to contracts outstanding as of the date of its passage.
In discussing the constitutionality of such legislation, it is helpful to
categorize it broadly as "retroactive"—in the sense that its operation gives
to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from those rights and duties
which would have accrued without its passage." Retroactivity is not objec-
tionable per se; it is grounds for holding a statute void only if it contravenes
37 See supra note 17.
38 Idaho Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 190, repealing Idaho Code Ann. § 37-1003d.
39 While this definition may be considered overly inclusive by some constitutional
scholars—see Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Law-Making, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 216 (1960)—it is technically proper. Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
692 (1960); London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60
(1943); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 Fed. Cas. 756
(No. 13156) (C.C.DN.H. 1814).
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a specific provision of the Constitution." Since the prohibition against a
post facto laws has been judicially limited to retroactive criminal legisla-
tion,41 there are left three constitutional mandates whose violation would be
grounds for questioning the legality of the statute: the guarantees against
impairment of the obligation of contract; 42 against deprivation of property
without due process of law; 43 and against denial of equal protection of the
laws.44
The Constitution provides that "no state shall . . . [make] any law
impairing the obligation of contracts." 45 It is well settled that any state
statute is a law within the meaning of Article I, section 10,4" whether the im-
pairment is by repeal or modification of the statute. 47 If possible, moreover,
the statute is to be construed as constitutional."
Decisions under the contracts clause have consistently found "impair-
ment" in laws which extinguished or rendered invalid the obligations of a
contract." The constitutional prohibition, however, is not absolute. All con-
tracts are subject to the fair and reasonable exercise of the sovereign govern-
mental power to conserve the general welfare, the police power.'" Thus, in
determining the validity of all legislation affecting contracts, the court must
balance the reserved police power of the state to safeguard the public inter-
est and the protection of the sanctity of private agreements."' Matters of
40 League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
41 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DaII.) 386 (1798).
42 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 	 1.
44 Ibid.
46 Supra note 42.
46 The Constitution of the United States of America 329 (Corwin ed. 1953).
47 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Lenoir City, Tenn., 72 F. Supp. 457 (ED. Tenn.
1947).
48 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1935) and cases cited therein.
42 Struges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197-98 (1819), holding invalid
a state insolvency law discharging the debtor from liability on contracts in existence
when the law was passed.
Such obligations, however, have been held not to be impaired if the legislature
merely modified the remedy without destroying the rights secured by the contract. Lynch
v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S.
437 (1903); Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866). This rule
applies if such modification neither denied the remedy outright nor so embarrassed it
with conditions or restrictions that the value of the right was seriously impaired.
Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1880); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311
(1843). The Supreme Court has enunciated the test as one of reasonableness, of which
the legislature is primarily the judge. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1882).
But such tests seem academic when the legislation merely allows a reasonable time to
dispose of equipment on the shelves while providing for the termination of existing
contracts without supplying any procedure for their enforcement.
60 For the development of this concept, see Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1933).
61 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes pointed out in the leading case of Home Bldg. and
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra note 50, at 435, the policy of upholding contract rights,
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
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public interest may not thus be placed by contract beyond the state's power
to regulate them.
It is important to note the dual nature of this qualification. Not only
must the legislation in question be concerned with a subject whose regula-
tion is properly within the state's police power jurisdiction, but this power
must be exercised in a reasonable manner.° In other words, the legislation
must be addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken must have
been reasonably appropriate to that end.53
Whether or not one or both of these limitations on the exercise of the
police power were satisfied in the Idaho statute is open to question. The
relevant factors in deciding this issue may be grouped into two general
categories. First, to what extent did the statute modify or abrogate the
pre-enactment rights of the parties? The greater the destruction of the pre-
existing rights, the weaker the case for constitutionality. 54 If the statute
abolishes the rights, it is void; 55 and such abolition seems precisely the result
of a literal reading of the termination provisions of the Idaho statute. Second,
what was the immediacy and severity of the conditions the legislature sought
to rectify? Subsumed under this heading are considerations of the nature
and strength of the public interest served by the statute, the situation at
the time of its passage, and the availability of alternate suitable remedies.
It would seem safe to assume no economic emergency" in Idaho to justify
the drastic solution of outright termination of pre-existing contracts. Thus,
even if the regulation of the dairy products equipment industry by utter
prohibition of all conditional sales in that area was an appropriate subject
for the police power, the power seems unreasonably exercised. While, as the
Court has held, liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint and not
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the in-
terest of the community," the far-reaching effect of the Idaho statute
strongly suggests that a strict construction of the method chosen by the
legislature in impairing the sanctity of existing contract rights was an un-
reasonable and, hence, unconstitutional abuse of legislative discretion.
relations are worthwhile—a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society.
Accord, Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 383 (1940), commending this approach as a
realistic appreciation of the evolutionary nature of our society.
32
 Without going into the plethora of authority arising from the often contra-
dictory judicial delineation of the limits of the police power jurisdiction, it is sufficient
to point out that the subject and method of the Idaho statute do not seem to meet
either of the two tests historically used by the Court. For the pre-1934 test of a
"business affected with a public interest," see the discussion by Mr. Chief Justice
Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535-36
(1923); for the post-1934 test that it is no longer the nature of the business but the
reasonableness of the regulation which controls, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
53 Supra note 50, at 438.
54 Hochman, supra note 39, at 712.
55 Id. at 711.
56
 The leading case on the changes in the scope of the police power during an
economic emergency is the Blaisdell decision, supra note 50.
37 Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1910).
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There is, however, a possible construction of the termination provisions
which would not raise the issue of constitutionality. A loose construction of
the word "terminate" would answer the argument of unconstitutionality
based on unreasonableness of method. If the effect of the statute is held to
be merely the elimination of the conditional sales contract from the dairy
products equipment market without depriving the seller of his remedy for the
price, the seller's rights would not seem sufficiently restricted to call forth
the constitutional prohibition against impairment. If the intent of the
legislature is only the deletion of the remedy of repossession, this being the
peculiar (and apparently undesirable) aspect of conditional sales contracts,
this restriction is reasonable, and hence constitutional. But if, on the other
hand, the provisions are strictly construed to erase both the remedy of re-
possession and the right to further payments on the contracts in question,
the statute would seem clearly unconstitutional.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that " .. .
[no state shall] deprive any person of ... property without due process of
law."58 Given the increasing acceptance of the proposition that a contract
right is "property" within the meaning of the amendment," the contracts
clause has coalesced with the due process clause in recent constitutional
decisions." One commentator has pointed out that no Supreme Court deci-
sion dealing with contracts in the past twenty-five years has not contained
language to the effect that what was said about the contracts clause was
equally applicable to a deprivation of property without due process. 81 Since
both contract and property rights are held subject to the proper and reason-
able exercise of the police power,° 2 the previous observations on the con-
stitutionality of the statute in question are equally pertinent here.
The Fourteenth Amendment also provides that ". .. [no state shall]
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 58
Since, however, few police power measures have been held unconstitutional
on this ground without a showing of discrimination on the basis of race or
nationality,'" the argument for the unconstitutionality under this clause is
rather weak. Since the Idaho statute legislates in favor of particular persons
or classes as apart from others in like conditions," an argument can be made
that the selection of conditional sellers of dairy products equipment was
sufficiently arbitrary to be tantamount to a denial of equal protection. But,
58 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I.
89 Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 890
(1944); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1922).
60 Hale, supra note 59, at 885-92.
61 Slawson, supra note 39, at 221. See Corwin, supra note 46, at 359, for a dis-
cussion of the decline in the use of the contracts clause with the judicial expansion of
the meaning of due process.
62 Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Goldsboro, 332 U.S. 548 (1914).
63 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
64 Corwin, supra note 46, at 1153.
65 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
It is interesting to note Mr. Justice Holmes' comment in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200, 208 (1927) that the equal protection clause was the "usual last resort of consti-
tutional arguments."
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given the strong presumption that the discrimination was based on adequate
grounds,°° and given the wide discretion of the legislature to select the classes
to be regulated," this argument would seem to fail.
In conclusion, any discussion of the constitutionality of this statute
raises the conflict of two of the postulates of a legal order: stability versus
change, the importance of the ability of the individual to rely on existing
laws" as qualified by the necessity of the law in a constitutional society to
develop with the times in order to adapt to new social conditions and con-
form to new ideas of the common good. In spite of John Marshall's famous
remonstrance that "It is a Constitution we are expounding,"°° the sanctity
of private agreements and the vested rights they create seem, in this in-
stance, paramount to a regulation as drastic and as severe as that promul-




The Connecticut legislature recently amended the section of that state's
sales below cost act, which had allowed proof of certain acts to be prima facie
evidence of intent to injure competitors.' Prior to the amendment, this
section provided:
No retailer shall with intent to injure competitors or destroy
competition, advertise, offer to sell or sell at retail any item of mer-
chandise at less than cost to the retailer, and no wholesaler shall,
with such intent, advertise, offer to sell or sell at wholesale any
item of merchandise at less than cost to the wholesaler. Evidence of
any advertisement, offer to sell or sale of any item of merchandise
by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost to him shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to injure competitors or destroy competi-
tion.2
 (Emphasis supplied.)
This section was declared unconstitutional by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors in Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli.3
 The court found
that the language of the section concerning proof of intent had the inevita-
66 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
67 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913) ; Orient Ins. Co. v. Diggs, 172 U.S. 557
(1889); Barber v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
68 Slawson, supra note 39, at 233, points out that this reliance is especially necessary
in the making of contracts, formal legal obligations into which the parties enter with
full and careful regard for the legal consequences.
439 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-114 (Supp. 1963).
2 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-114 (1958).
3 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961), noted in 36 Conn. B.J.147 (1962).
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